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Eyewitness identifications are important to jurors, especially in criminal trials. Psychological research has shown, however, that eyewitness testimony is systematically fallible in
ways that undermine the goals of the rules of evidence. This article assesses the arguments
for and against admitting expert testimony concerning cognitive science research about
eyewitness identification. The article concludes that experts should in many instances be
allowed to testify about the problems with eyewitness identification testimony.
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1. Introduction

Insights about human psychology that stem from research in cogmt1ve science have
been considered in many areas of law. 1 Such insights are especially relevant to the law
of evidence. Since the overarching goal of the rules of evidence is to determine the
truth, insofar as human memory and cognition do not lead to truth, the law of evidence
should take such systematic fallibility into account. If human memory and cognition
systematically fail to be 'truth-tropic' 2 (that is, if they fail to get at the truth), then the law
of evidence should deal with this by creating safeguards against these cognitive defects.
Such safeguards would help triers of fact to be appropriately sceptical of evidence that
results from systematically fallible cognitive processes.
In this short article, I focus on one way of safeguarding against testimony that relies on
cognitive processes that are not truth-tropic, namely allowing scientific experts to testify
about memory and cognition problems relating to eyewitnesses identification. This is an
especially important topic for several reasons. First, it is well established that juries put
great weight on eyewitness testimony. 3 Second, particularly in criminal cases, eyewitness
I See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000); Jeffery Rachlinksi, Behavioral
Economics Law and Psychology: Heuristics And Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 19 OR. L.
REV. 61 (2000); D. Michael Risinger & Jeffrey L. Loop, Three Card Monte, Monty Hall, Modus Operandi and
'Offender Profiling': Some Lessons of Modem Cognitive Science for the Law of Evidence, 24 CARDOZO L. REV.
193 (2000); Cass Sunstein et al., Assessing Putative Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law),
107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998).
2 See EDWARD STEIN, WITHOUT GOOD REASON : THE RATIONALITY DEBATE IN PHILOSOPHY AND
COGNITIVE SCIENCE 26 (1996) (introducing term 'truth-tropic').
3 See, e.g., Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341,352 (I 981)('[D]espite its inherent unreliability, much eyewitness
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testimony is crucial to the trier of fact's deliberations. 4 Third, cognitive science research
has, over the past several decades, established with a high degree of certainty that,
in various ways and contexts, humans make systematic mistakes involving eyewitness
testimony. 5 In light of these reasons, the project of trying to safeguard against biases in
memory and cognition is important for our legal system. This is especially borne out by the
significant role that eyewitness testimony has played in a substantial number of wrongful
convictions. 6
In this short article, rather than provide a detailed survey of cognitive science research
on the systematic biases and errors involved in eyewitness testimony, I will just mention
two specific results of this research. It has been scientifically well established that, in
general, an eyewitness is less reliable when attempting to identify a specific individual of
a different race. 7 Another well-established cognitive science result concerning eyewitness
testimony is that an eyewitness's degree of certainty about an identification is, at best,
weakly correlated with the accuracy of the identification. 8
Calling a scientist who does research on eyewitness identification as an expert witness
identification evidence has a powerful impact on juries. Juries seem most receptive to, and not inclined to
discredit, testimony of a witness who states that he saw the defendant commit the crime .... [T]here is almost
nothing more convincing than a live human being who takes the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says
'That's the one!") (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quotations and footnote omitted); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98,
120 (1977) ('juries unfortunately are often unduly receptive to [eyewitness identification] evidence.') (Marshall,
J., dissenting); BRIAN CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS,
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 179 (1995) (concluding, after summarizing relevant scientific research, that 'jurors
overestimate the accuracy of eyewitness identifications'); ELIZABETH LOFTUS & JAMES DOYLE, EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 1-8 (1997) (discussing juror misconceptions about and overconfidence in
eyewitness testimony); LAWRENCE WRIGHTMAN et al., Ps YCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 171 (5th ed.
2002) ('Eyewitness testimony may be the least reliable but most persuasive form of evidence presented in court.');
Gary Wells, Eyewitness Identifications: Scientific Status, in SCIENCE IN THE LAW: SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE ISSUES 397-416 (David Faigman et al. eds., 2002) (discussing research on eyewitness testimony and
noting that such research suggests juries are often persuaded by eyewitness testimony even when it is mistaken).
4
See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT I
(1999) ('The legal system has always relied on the testimony of eyewitnesses, nowhere more than in criminal
cases.').
5 See, e.g., LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 3, at 9-93; Wells, supra note 3, at 402-413.
6 See, e.g., E.T. CONNORS et al., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES
IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996) (finding that 24 out of
28 cases of post-conviction exoneration based on DNA testing were due in great part to mistaken eyewitness
identifications); BARRY SCHECK et al., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 246 (2000) (52 out of 62 post-conviction
exonerations based on DNA testing involved mistaken eyewitness identification). Roger Park, who commented
on this paper, correctly noted that the subject pools for these studies constitute samples in which it is more likely
to find mistaken eyewitness identifications than in criminal cases involving eyewitness testimony generally.
1 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1392 (3d Cir. 1991) ('Scholarly literature attacking the
trustworthiness of cross-racial identification is now legion.'); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1106 (6th
Cir. 1984) (finding scientific research on cross-racial identification to be reliable); LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra
note 3, at 86 ('It is well established that there exists a comparative difficulty in recognizing individual members
of a race different from one's own [race].'); Wells, supra note 3, at 404 ('There is little debate over the fact
that people have more difficulty recognizing people of another race than they do people of their own race.')
(citing Chris Meissner & John Brigham, A Meta-analysis of the Other-Race Effect in Eyewitness Identification,
7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 3 (2001)); Jennifer L. Devenport et al., Eyewitness Identification Evidence:
Evaluating Commonsense Evaluations, 3 PSYCH . PUB. POL'Y & L. 338 (1997); J.P. Rutledge, They All Look
Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial Identifications, 28 AM. J . CRIM. L . 207 (2001).
8 See, e.g., LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 3, at 67 ('The consensus of the literature that deals with [whether
eyewitness confidence is an indication of eyewitness accuracy] seems to indicate that eyewitness confidence is
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for the purpose of assisting jurors in putting eyewitness testimony into appropriate
perspective has a long pedigree. The first appellate case that discusses expert testimony on
the cognitive limitations of eyewitnesses seems to be Criglow v. State, a 1931 Arkansas
state court case in which the trial court excluded expert testimony on a hypothetical
question about the powers of observation and recollection of eyewitnesses who were
frightened and were not acquainted with the alleged perpetrator. 9 Many courts have, like
the Criglow court, viewed expert testimony on eyewitness identification with suspicion
and, historically, most have excluded such expert testimony. IO Recently, however, some
courts have become more willing to admit such evidence. 11 In this paper, I evaluate the
arguments for and against the admissibility of expert testimony concerning eyewitness
identification and sketch a defence of the admissibility of such testimony.
2. Prima facie argument for admissibility of expert testimony on the cognitive science
research on problems with eyewitness identification

In this paragraph, I present (but do not defend) a prima facie plausible argument for the
admissibility of expert testimony about eyewitness identification. Among the goals of the
Federal Rules of Evidence are truth and faimess. 12 Given the importance of eyewitness
testimony to jurors, the importance of eyewitness testimony in criminal cases, and the
dramatic scientific evidence that eyewitness testimony is systematically fallible in ways
that lead away from truth and towards unjust verdicts, something should be done to protect
against such errors. In particular, experts who understand the systematic problems in
memory and cognition can explain the effects of these problems on eyewitness testimony.
The rules of evidence are liberal in what they admit, 13 and expert testimony is admissible
under the rules of evidence. 14 Therefore, cognitive science experts should, all else being
equal, be able to testify about problems with eyewitness identification in order to safeguard
against triers of fact relying on mistaken identifications. This argument has, in effect, been
rejected by some courts and accepted by others. 15
not a very good indicator of eyewitness accuracy'); Wells, supra note 3, at 412 ('[T]he certainty an eyewitness
expresses in his identification can be a misleading indicator of the identification's accuracy.').
9 Criglow v. State, 183 Ark. 407 (1931).
10 See infra notes 16-27.
11 See infra notes 28--47.
12 Fed. R. Evid. 102 ('These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end
that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.').
13 Fed. R. Evid. 402 ('All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided.'). See also Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579,587 (1993) ('The Rules' basic standard of relevance ... is a liberal
one').
14 Fed. R. Evid. 702 ('If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (I) the testimony
is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.'). See also Daubert, 509
U.S. 579 (interpreting Fed. R. Evid. 702 with respect to admissibility of scientific expert testimony); Kumho Tire
Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (extending Daubert to expert testimony about technical and other
specialized knowledge).
15 Compare United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1106 (7th Cir. 1999) (excluding expert testimony on
eyewitness identification), with United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1232 (3d Cir. 1985) ('The logic of
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3. Arguments against admitting such expert testimony
In this section, I discuss arguments in support of the view that expert testimony on
eyewitness identification is not admissible, drawing on the position of the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit that expert testimony on eyewitness identification is 'strong[ly]
disfavored' 16 and the position of the Eleventh Circuit that such testimony is per se
inadmissible. 17
Many courts considering the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness
identification have, in applying Rule 702, found that such expert testimony does not assist
the trier of fact. However, courts have given different-often contradictory-reasons for
why expert testimony does not assist the trier of fact. First, some courts have found that
jurors already know, as a matter of common sense, that eyewitness testimony is fallible
and, based on this, they are appropriately sceptical of eyewitness testimony. 18 The second
reason (which is in tension with the first) that courts give for excluding expert testimony
under Rule 702 is that juries will be confused by such testimony. 19 Third, various courts
have found that cognitive science research on human memory and cognition is too general
to be useful to triers of fact. 2 Fourth, some courts liave found that expert testimony
on eyewitness identification is not admissible under Rule 702 because the scientific
evidence about eyewitness identification is neither reliable nor does it satisfy the test for
admissibility laid out by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
509 U.S. 579 (1993). 21 Relatedly, some courts have found that allowing expert testimony

°

Fed. R. Evid. 702 is inexorable ... and requires ... that expert testimony on eyewitness perception and memory
be admitted at least in some circumstances.').
16 Hall, 165 F.3d at I 106. See also United States v. Crotteau, 218 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Hudson, 884 F.2d 1016, 1027 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Watson, 587 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1978); but see Krist
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 897 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1990) (ruminating about contexts in which expert testimony might be
admissible and suggesting a more favorable view than prior and subsequent Seventh Circuit opinions).
17 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1997) ('[T]his court has consistently
looked unfavorably on [expert] testimony [regarding eyewitness reliability] .'); United States v. Holloway, 971
F.2d 675, 679 (11th Cir. 1992) ('The established rule of this circuit is that [expert] testimony [about eyewitness
identification] is not admissible.').
18 See, e.g., United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 971 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding jury aware of hazards
of eyewitness identification without expert testimony); Hudson, 884 F.2d at 1024 ('expert testimony [about
eyewitness identification) will not aid the jury because it addresses an issue of which the jury is already generally
aware ... '); United States v. Serna, 799 F.2d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 1986) (expert testimony on eyewitness testimony
consists of mere commonsense claims); United States v. Purham, 725 F.2d 450,454 (8th Cir. 1984); United States
v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616,641 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381,383 (1st Cir. 1979).
19 See, e.g., United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280,289 (2d Cir. 2000) ('proposed testimony and explication
of scientific studies would have confused the jury[).').
20 See, e.g., United States v. Brien, 59 F.3d 274, 277 (1st Cir. 1995) ('[cognitive science] experts . .. largely
offer rather obvious generalities.'); Jordan v. DuCharme, 983 F.2d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 1993) (allowing that
expert testimony might be allowed about 'specific identifications in the case, rather than the general reliability
of eyewitness testimony.'). Other courts have argued that the more general expert testimony on eyewitness
identification is the better the case for its admissibility. For discussion, see, e.g., David Faigman et al., The Legal
Relevance of Research on Eyewitness Identifications, in SCIENCE IN THE LAW: SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE ISSUES 369, 378-79 (2000).
21 See, e.g., United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 883 (8th Cir. 1996) ('proffered expert testimony and eyewitness
identification fails to qualify as 'scientific knowledge' under Daubert[]'); United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921,
924-25 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Poole, 794 F.2d 462, 468 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Watson, 587
F.2d 365, 369 (7th Cir. 1978).
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on eyewitness identification would invade an essential function of juries, namely assessing
the reliability of witnesses. 22
Some courts have found expert testimony on eyewitness identification inadmissible
under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which authorizes the exclusion of relevant evidence
that, on balance, is not worth a court's time or will likely confuse or mislead the
jury. 23 Various courts have provided different accounts of how expert testimony on
eyewitness identification should be excluded on the basis of the so-called '403 balancing
test.' Some courts have found that such expert testimony should be excluded because
it will confuse, mislead, and/or overwhelm juries. 24 Other courts have held that such
testimony should be excluded under rule 403 because its probative value is outweighed by
efficiency considerations relating to the risk of a battle of experts or a 'mini-trial' within
a trial about eyewitness testimony. 25 Relatedly, some courts have found that, because of
concerns related to Rule 403, expert testimony is less preferable than alternative means
of protecting triers of fact from the fallibilities of eyewitness testimony, namely educating
juries about such fallibilities through cross-examination of eyewitnesses26 or through jury
instructions. 27
4. Replies to arguments against admitting such testimony
In this section, I reply to these arguments and defend the admissibility of expert testimony
concerning eyewitness identification, focusing on the view of the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, which strongly favours admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness
identification insofar as such testimony is relevant. 28 For the sake of examining the
22 See, e.g., Lumpkin, 192 F.3d at 289; Hall, 165 F.3d at 1107 ('credibility of eyewitness testimony is generally
not an appropriate subject matter for expert testimony because it influences a critical function of the jurydetermining the credibility of witnesses'); Kime, 99 F.3d at 884 ('[t]he evaluation of eyewitness testimony is for
the jury alone. It is the exclusive province of the jury to determine the believability of a witness.') (quotation
omitted).
23 Fed. R. Evid. 403 ('Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.')
24 See, e.g., Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (expert testimony on correlation between confidence and accuracy
'would have confused the jury[]'); Rincon. 28 F.3d at 926; Serna, 799 F.2d at 850 (expert testimony would
'muddy the waters'); Fosher, 590 F.2d at 383 Oury would be overwhelmed by expert's 'aura of special reliability
and trustworthiness.').
25 See, e.g., Thevis, 665 F.2d at 641 (expressing concern about 'open[ing] the door to a barrage of marginally
relevant psychological evidence' ); Fosher, 590 F.2d at 384; United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 150 (9th Cir.
1974) rev 'd on other grounds sub nom United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S . 225 (1975).
26 See, e.g., Hall, 165 F.3d at 1107 ('any weaknesses in eyewitness identification testimony ordinarily can be
exposed through careful cross-examination of the eyewitnesses.'); Smith, 122 F.3d at 1358-59; United States v.
Hicks, 103 F.3d 837,847 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532,536 (4th Cir. 1993); Larkin, 978
F.2d at 971; United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1051-52 (7th Cir. 1992) ('vigourous cross-examination' of
eyewitnesses was sufficient to exclude 'intrusion' of expert testimony on eyewitness identifications); Thevis, 665
F.2d at 641; United States v. Amard, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973).
27 See, e.g., Hall, 165 F.3d at 1107; Hicks, 103 F.3d at 847; Rincon, 28 F.3d at 925 (finding trial judge's jury
instructions provided similar information as expert testimony would have).
28 See, e.g., United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321,336 & 340 (3d Cir. 2000) (the Third Circuit has 'disavowed
skepticism of [expert] testimony [about eyewitness identifications] as a matter of principle' and embraced the
view that 'experts who apply reliable scientific expertise to juridically pertinent aspects of the human mind and
body should generally, absent explicable reasons to the contrary, be welcomed by federal courts'); United States

300

E. STEIN

principles of evidence rather than the detailed results of scientific research, I will assume
that the scientific conclusions about eyewitness testimony are well supported29 and satisfy
the 'general acceptance' test of Daubert. 30
First, the results of scientific research on human memory and cognition, generally, and
eyewitness identification, specifically, are quite counterintuitive and hardly commonsensical. 31 It is hard to accept, for example, that an eyewitness's degree of confidence about an
identification is weakly or not at all correlated with the accuracy of such identifications. 32
Even when the conclusions of cognitive science research mesh with common sense, the
specificity of the results of such research cannot plausibly count as commonsensical. For
example, it is somewhat plausible that people are less reliable at identifying people of
different races than they are at identifying those of the same race. Scientific evidence
confirms this intuition. 33 However, it is also plausible that frequent contact with members
of another race would increase the accuracy of identifications of members of that race. This
intuition has not been confirmed by scientific evidence. 34 In general, jurors are unaware of
the results of cognitive science research and, in any event, fail to grasp the significance of
what such studies show because their results are counterintuitive and require explanation. 35
Introducing expert testimony on eyewitness identification would help the trier of fact
appropriately weigh eyewitness testimony. 36
Second, it is certainly true that whenever scientific evidence is introduced in a trial,
v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380 (3d Cir. 1991); Downing, 753 F.2d at 1243. See also, United States v. Smithers, 212
F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000).
29 See, e.g., CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 3, at 55-136; LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 3, at 1-93; Wells,
supra note 3.
3o See, e.g., Saul Kassin et al., On the 'General Acceptance' of Eyewitness Testimony Research, 56 AM.
PSYCHOL. 405 (2001); Wells, supra note 3, at 381.
31 See, e.g., CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 3, at 171-209.
32 See, e.g., LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 3, at 66 ('It seems intuitively reasonable to assume that a witness
is more likely to be correct if he or she projects certainty rather than doubt.'); Wells, supra note 3, at 412
('the certainty an eyewitness expresses in his identification can be a misleading indicator of the identification's
accuracy.').
33 See, e.g., LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 3, at 86; Wells, supra note 3, at 404; Devenport et al., supra note
7; Chris Meissner & John Brigham, A Meta-Analysis of the Other-Race Effect in Eyewitness Identification, 1
PSYCHOL. PUB . POL'Y & L . 3 (2001).
34 See, e.g., Daniel Levin, Race as a Visual Feature: Using Visual Search and Perceptual Discrimination Tasks
to Understand Face Categories and the Cross-Race Recognition Deficit, 129 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
GEN. 559 (2000); W. Ng & R. C. L. Lindsay, Cross-race Facial Recognition: Failure of the Contact Hypothesis,
25 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 217 (1994).
35 See, e.g., CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 3, at 171-209; LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 3, 292-294;
ELIZABETH LOFTUS & JAMES DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 11-11 (Supp.
2000); Devenport, supra note 7; Saul Kassin & Kimberly Bamdollar, The Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony: A
Comparison ofExperts and Prospective Jurors, 22 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1241 (1992). See also Mathis, 264 F.3d
at 341 ('testimony of this sort, with its accompanying level of scientific detail, would not simply duplicate jurors'
intuitions or common sense'); Smithers, 212 F.3d at 313 ('jurors are unaware of several scientific principles
affecting eyewitness identifications . . . [and], because many of the factors affecting eyewitness impressions
are counter-intuitive, many jurors' assumptions about how memories are created are actively wrong') (citation
omitted); United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding expert testimony admissible
because 'the conclusions of the psychological studies are largely counter-intuitive, and serve to explode common
myths about an individual's capacity for perception.') (quotation and citation omitted); Downing, 753 F.2d at
1230 ('this type of expert testimony can satisfy the helpfulness test of Rule 702').
36 See, e.g., CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 3, at 213-242; Wells, supra note 3, at 416-419. With respect to
cross-racial eyewitness identification specifically, see, e.g., Meissner & Brigham, supra note 33.
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there is a heightened risk of confusion. This is especially true when the evidence introduced
is counterintuitive. However, this increased risk of confusion should be outweighed
when the proffered expert testimony is especially probative. Given that jurors are unduly
receptive to eyewitness identification and are not sufficiently sceptical of it, 37 expert
testimony about eyewitness identification is an important antidote to the overvaluing of
eyewitness testimony even though jurors may be confused by it. Given jurors' receptivity to
eyewitness testimony, if a defendant is going to be convicted primarily on the basis of such
testimony, then it is surely worth risking confusion in order to provide jurors with a more
realistic perspective on eyewitness testimony. Third, and relatedly, the results of cognitive
science research are not too general but rather are of the appropriate level of generality for
the purpose of assisting jurors to take a realistic view of eyewitness testimony. 38
Fourth, expert testimony on eyewitness identification does not invade the role of
the jury. Sometimes, when a court refuses to admit expert testimony on eyewitness
identification, the refusal seems based on the concern that the expert witness might testify
on an ultimate issue of fact, such as whether the defendant was actually the person that
the witness saw at a particular time and place.39 The thought is that such issues of fact
are for the jury to decide. However, Federal Rule of Evidence 704 explicitly says that
opinion testimony should not be excluded simply because it concerns an issue of fact. 40 In
particular, the notes of the advisory committee that proposed the rules of evidence say that
Rule 704 'specifically abolished' the 'so-called 'ultimate issue' rule.' 41
Turning to reasons for excluding expert testimony related to Rule 403, expert testimony
on eyewitness identification must, like all other evidence, pass the 403 balancing test even
if it is relevant and is admissible under Rule 702. If, in a particular case, eyewitness
identification is not especially important to the deliberations, then expert testimony about
biases and errors related to eyewitness identifications will have little probative value to
that case. Under Rule 403, expert testimony should be excluded in such a case. However,
many courts that have applied Rule 403 and found expert testimony inadmissible on that
basis have done so in cases quite different than the one just imagined. Such courts have
found, in effect, that expert testimony on eyewitness identification is inadmissible under
Rule 403 because expert testimony is confusing, misleading or likely to lead to a battle
of experts. 42 In many instances, however, expert testimony on eyewitness identification
will be important for uncovering the truth and reaching a just verdict. Especially in
criminal trials, in which eyewitness identification is an important piece of evidence, expert
testimony about the biases and errors involved in eyewitness identification will be relevant,
worth the time, and worth the risk of juror confusion. 43 Further, concerns about a 'mini37 See supra note 3.
38 See, e.g., FAIGMAN et al., supra note 20, at 378-79.
39 See, e.g., Kime, 99 F.3d at 884.
4 Fed. R. Evid. 704 ('[T]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.'). This does not mean
that experts are permitted to testify about whether a specific witness is reliable-in general, they are not. Rather,
Rule 704 means that more general expert testimony is admissible even if it bears on an issue related to a question
to be decided by the trier of fact.
41 Fed. R. Evid. 704(a) advisory committee's note.
42 See supra notes 24 and 25 .
43 See, e.g., Downing, 753 F.2d at 1239 & 1240 ('After assessing the reliability of the evidence, the [trial] court
must also weigh any danger that the evidence might confuse or mislead the jury. It may seem paradoxical to

°

302

E. STEIN

trial' within a trial and about battles of experts, while not trivial, arise any time experts
testify. The time involved in admitting expert testimony is occasionally warranted by
the help that such evidence gives to triers of fact. 44 Expert testimony about eyewitness
identification should be admissible under the rules, especially since research suggests that
such expert testimony may improve juror functioning. 45
With regards to the allegedly more efficient alternatives to expert testimonycross-examination and jury instructions-expert testimony is surely better than crossexamination of eyewitnesses as a way of educating a jury about problems with eyewitness
identification. In general, since most people are unaware of their own cognitive biases
and fallibilities, 46 cross-examination of eyewitnesses will be impotent to bring out the
problems with the eyewitnesses' cognitive processes. 47 Similarly, expert testimony is
probably better than jury instructions as a way of educating a jury about problems with
eyewitness identification. Being told the results of scientific research in a conclusory
manner by a judge is not a more effective way of educating a jury about the cognitive
biases and errors involved in eyewitness identification. 48 Jury instructions come too late in
the trial to affect the jury's assessment of witnesses and their testimony. In general, it would
suggest that scientific evidence based on principles bearing substantial indicia of reliability could confuse rather
than assist the jury, but . . . this may be so, in some cases ... . The trial court must then balance its assessment
of the reliability of [the scientific research on which an expert is testifying] against the danger that the evidence,
even though reliable, might nonetheless confuse or mislead the finder of fact, and decide whether the evidence
should be admitted.').
44 See, e.g., id. at 1243 n. 27 ('Some courts, concerned with the prospect of creating a new 'cottage industry'
of psychological experts who will be asked to testify in every case involving eyewitness testimony, and with the
spectre of criminal cases turning into a 'battle of the experts' that misleads the jury and confuses the issues, have
excluded this expert testimony on the grounds that its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value . . . . We are
sympathetic to these concerns but are not moved by the legal point ... . [T]he district court has the discretionary
authority to limit the number of experts who may testify and the length of their testimony. At all events, if the
testimony is highly probative and meets the conditions set forth above concerning reliability, the likelihood of
misleading the jury, and the requisite specificity in the offer of proof, the parties are entitled to present it, whether
or nor it adds to the length of the trial; presumably such evidence will add clarity and enhance the truth-seeking
function of the trial, thereby offsetting the disadvantage of delay.') (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
45 See, e.g., CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 3, at 268 ('There are now sound reasons to believe that jurors
not only need [expert] testimony [on eyewitness identification] but [that they] also benefit from it'); LOFTUS &
DOYLE, supra note 3, at 296 ('Recent research .. . suggests that while expert testimony is no panacea, it does
enhance the quality of jury deliberations').
46 See, e.g., STEIN, supra note 2 at 159-161 (arguing that, in general, humans are poor at intuiting the character
of their own cognitive processes).
47 See, e.g., CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 3, at 143-168; Wells, supra note 3, at 412 (finding that witness's
high degrees of confidence in identification is 'no more likely to be shaken by cross-examination' whether
identification is accurate or inaccurate). See also Downing, 753 F.2d at 1231 n.6 ('To the extent that a mistaken
witness may retain great confidence in an inaccurate identification, cross-examination can hardly be seen as an
effective way to reveal the weaknesses in a witness' recollection of an event'); United States v. Hines, 55 F.
Supp. 2d 62, 72 (D. Mass 1999) ('In the absence of an expert, a defence lawyer ... may try to argue that cross
racial identifications are more problematic than identifications between members of the same race . . . , but his
voice necessarily lacks the authority of the scientific studies'). Cf LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 3, at 226-229
(discussing strategies for cross-examination of eyewitnesses).
48 See, e.g., CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 3, at 264 ('judges' instructions do not serve as an effective
safeguard against mistaken identifications and convictions'). Cf LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 3, at 327344 (discussing strategies for approaching jury instructions concerning eyewitness testimony); Neil Vidmar, Are
Juries Competent to Decide Liability in Tort Cases Involving Scientific/Medical Issues? Some Data from Medical
Malpractice, 43 EMORY L.J. 885 (1994) (suggesting, in a different context, that expert testimony is more effective
than jury instructions).
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be better for the goals of truth and justice to introduce expert testimony on the fallibility of
eyewitness identification and let the parties attempt to make the case for the relevance (or
irrelevance) of such scientific evidence to the identifications at issue rather than have the
judge, just before the jury begins its deliberations, issue general instructions on the value
of and problems with eyewitness testimony.

5. Conclusion
Given that current scientific research suggests that eyewitness testimony is systematically
biased or fallible, when eyewitness identification testimony is important to a trial, expert
testimony on well-established cognitive science research should be admissible under both
Rule 702 and Rule 403. The goals of obtaining truth and justice can be better achieved by
having scientific experts assist the jury by putting eyewitness testimony in the appropriate
perspective.
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